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The Performance/Thought of Roland Barthes 
Hollis Huston* 
Life is not an academy, still less a military academy; instruction 
has to find a way to become art. 
—Geoffrey H. Hartman 1 
This is an essay about how hard it is to write an intelligent essay about 
performance. I have not been able to digest completely into neutral prose two 
partial voices who intrude on this discussion. Roland Barthes, who models a 
critical persona that pretends to unite the two voices who shout from different 
sides of the mind, has no need of my approval, and this is not a polemic in his 
favor. It is, rather, the record of a spectator's response to Barthes, a spectator 
who says to himself " I can do that; I must do tha t . " May not performance be 
liberated from text, as Barthes has liberated literature from language? Is not 
literature the performance of language? 
PROLOGUE 
The gap between performance and thought is alarming. If theory seeks the 
structure of thought and art its movement, then a thoughtful performer must 
bestride not only that gap but its double as well. Performance is an exponent 
of thought's movement, raising it to a new power, a moving movement. The 
theory of performance is therefore a kind of cubist undertaking, forcing onto 
the plane of writing facets that cannot be viewed from the same point: 
structure, movement, and a moving structure of movement on the same 
canvas. It can't be done, except by sleight-of-hand. The theory must perform 
itself. The gap is not of distance, but of site; the two faces look away from each 
other, joined behind the eyes. The bar that joins them is not a theory of 
performance, but a performance/theory. 
* Hollis Huston teaches in the theatre program at Washington University. He is currently 
executive director of the Holy Roman Repertory Company—a radio d rama company. His essays 
have appeared in a number of journals and professional publications. 
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Every artist should be a theoretician, if only in self-protection. Every 
theoretician should be an artist, if only as an incentive to responsibility. 
Perhaps criticism, on the other hand, should be left to amateurs.2 To bring art 
and theory together, performance and thought, seems an obvious thing to do. 
They are so close—for with hindsight on finished work we see that the two are 
homologous, superimposed on each other in an almost perfect match. For so 
many centuries we have tried to say, silenced sometimes by repression and 
sometimes by the knots in our tongues, not that the play speaks thought, but 
that it is thought (and the thought which it speaks too often obscures the 
thought which it is). But as play and thought hover before us, feeding each 
other like pulmonary and nervous systems, mere aspects each of the other, we 
are deceived. We cannot see that the two systems float in different planes, no 
more connected than the layers of organs on the cellophane sheets of an 
encyclopedia's anatomy diagram. The homology is real, but there is no 
process to connect its terms, separated as they are by a barrier of time which, 
though not impenetrable, always seals itself behind us. I can think, or do, but 
never both. In the midst of play, I cannot even see its thought; thinking its 
thought, I cannot play. And only hindsight, glossing over the particles of time 
in an incoherent edenic blend, makes it seem that I lived two moments at 
once. 
Must I choose between doing and knowing what others have done? To 
evade that costly choice, you must know that the synthesis you seek is neither 
fundamental nor natural, that its reality is no more no less than a convincing 
performance; and you must know that the role is a double one. Behind the 
scenes, like Poche and Chandebise,3 you will dash from one farcical door to 
another, dressing on the run. The scholar/artist flops like a stranded fish 
between two intimately antagonistic roles which, if the dance is nimble 
enough, appear to be their own and each other's causes. Tea for two. 
Barthes acts as though the gap between performance and thought could be 
closed, pointing us always toward what has not been said (or what is not aware 
of its own speech), toward marginalia, toward popular culture, toward the 
interactions of multiple codes of meaning, toward the print of the reader's 
body in the reading of text, toward the print of his own reading body in 
writing. Description is to art, he said, as paraphrase is to the poem. Literature 
is " the deception of language": it is what escapes, a mark of what still cannot 
write its name. Artistic theory must therefore extend language to what it 
cannot yet encompass, breaking present barriers in favor of a larger circum-
ference. 
Perhaps it will some day be possible to describe all literature as the art 
of disappointment, of frustration. The history of literature will then no 
longer be the history of the contradictory answers writers have given to 
the question of meaning but, quite the contrary, the history of the 
question itself.4 
Literature disrupts language. To say " a cat is a reptile" is to speak falsely; 
to say " a rose is a flower" is to speak truly. But to say " m y love is like a red, 
red rose" is to speak neither truly nor falsely, but rather, between two ideas 
which linguistic space holds far apart, to point out the invisible yet resonant 
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hyperspace shortcut. Can there be such a thing as a theory of literature? or, 
even more problematic, as a performance/theory? a translation which does 
not betray? Theory tries to speak, while performance fails if it can be spoken. 
Barthes changed the idea of what it is the theorist must speak. His writing 
became a "structuralist activity," a new poetics "which seeks less to assign 
completed meanings to the objects it discovers than to know how meaning is 
possible, at what cost and by what means . " 5 Thus he transformed the purpose 
of theory from exegesis to functional analysis, and its method from description 
to simulation. "Structuralism is essentially an activity of imitation" \ which is as 
much as to say that the theoretician is to be recognized not by a certain kind of 
difference from the work on which he commments, but by a certain kind of 
similarity—"there is, strictly speaking, no technical difference between struc-
turalism as an intellectual activity, on the one hand, and literature in 
particular, art in general, on the other ." 6 The performer can think, provided 
that thinking is pretty much like performing. The thinker can write without 
betraying his subject, if his writing performs. 
"If by some 'structuralist activity' we make a simulacrum of art, is not 
that simulacrum a work of art itself? and does not this new work, 
constructed to do something rather than to say something, require a 
thinker to recuperate its meaning into language? Are we not merely 
postponing the dilemma of Criticism?"7 
And another voice stage left asks whether there is no value in postpone-
ment. 
" I s the critic's consummation to be approved of, merely because he so 
devoutly wishes it? Is the closure of meaning entailed in 'criticism' 
worth the price? Closure will always exclude what brought you to the 
theatre ." 
As I follow Barthes into the wilderness, therefore, I am not alone, for 
Poche and Chandebise follow me, I cannot shut my ears to an argument that 
rages within my own head. The future is at stake, and access to the promised 
land where performance and thought shall meet. 
FEAR OF MARGINS 
But on the day when the Philosopher's word would justify the marginal 
jests of the debauched imagination, or when what has been marginal 
would leap to the center, every trace of the center would be lost. 
— The Name of the Rose8 
From right and left the insults fly. The voice on the right calls the voice on 
the left a vagrant and a whore; left calls right a thug and a parasite. This is no 
polite argument: sounds of a scuffle, of fisticuffs, of breaking glass, of cabinets 
careening down spiral staircases. Blow of a truncheon on bone. In truth, the 
body is vagrant, a sly enemy to each empire of thought, an excessive source, a 
reminder that thought cannot think itself. Discourse, therefore, even that 
enlightened critical discourse which acknowledges its debt to the body, must 
suppress that body to keep the peace and carry on its business. 
From the left, quiet for the last few moments, a very rude noise. 
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. . . the fart and the belch would claim the right that is only of the 
spirit, to breathe where they list!9 
Though Aristotle recognized the soul of the drama when he saw it, he was 
so embarrassed by its body that he refused to discuss it.10 Nevertheless, the 
discovery of a copy of his vanished book on the Comedy puts Umberto Eco's 
fourteenth-century monks into a murderous frenzy. The justification of 
comedy unleashes all that the learned cleric has labored to suppress: an unholy 
trinity of fool, idler, and glutton. The actor, a corpulent ambassador from the 
margins of text, always brings a new piece to the puzzle we thought we had 
solved. 
If he were God, he would keep reversing the victories.11 
The academy is, therefore, sworn to protect us from the performer, and from 
language's excess; but the performing artist (or the artist, performing?) is 
always sworn enemy to this form of language. 
The very task of love and of language is to give to one and the same 
phrase inflections which will be forever new, thereby creating an 
unheard-of speech in which the sign's form is repeated but never is 
signified.12 
For the timelessness of art is anarchism. The eternal work of art is a work that 
bursts all languages, always. 
I would define the poetic effect as the capacity that a text displays for 
continuing to generate different readings, without ever being com-
pletely consumed. 
, —Umberto Eco13 
In order to burst a language, of course, a literary work must first be admitted 
to it. But an actor speaks without language, summoning import like a black 
magician from nothing. "Take my wife—please." His place in the common-
wealth of letters is, to say the least, contestable. 
University departments and learned disciplines have been founded on the 
idea that, while art is mysterious, someone must think clearly about it. 
Though the artist may speak with a privileged eccentricity, the critic, we 
generally think, must speak with a clarity which proves that his language 
carries no prejudice. 
Language . . . is quite simply fascist.14 
Barthes accuses the critical voice of perpetrating, with its myth of clarity, a 
fiction which lacks the courage to admit itself as such. 
" T h e 'mystery' of art is a myth! Art should expose itself, and put the 
critics out of work! Criticism lies when it pretends to innocence! The 
only honest writing about art is a writing that partakes of art 's 
subjunctivity,15 a writing that shows itself to be 'made up , ' a writing 
which does more than it says, a writing which—like the actor who would 
not have us really believe he is H a m l e t — P E R F O R M S ! " 
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Sublimity flashing forth at the right moment scatters everything before 
it like a thunderbolt. 
—Longinus1 6 
"Yet after the flash and the clap of thunder, effective as they are, I 
must repair the roof. What else am I to do? If I deserted my post, you 
would have to step in and do my job for me. Don' t forget that this 
division of labor is in your interest. I stay on the ground so that you can 
fly." 
T H E MORAL ISSUE OF PARAPHRASE 
No literature in the world has ever answered the question it asked, and 
it is this very suspension that has always constituted it as literature.17 
The text named Roland Barthes, refusing in the presence of the question 
its homage to the answer, acts out the role of literature. It rejects the sovereign 
seat offered the critic, from which an omniscient subject might observe the art 
object. For Barthes, there can be no innocent sight. "Knowledge is a taking of 
sides,"1 8 reading is a writing,19 objectivity is an ideology in bad faith.20 Truth 
is a performance, not a discovery, and when the performance is well-received, 
there can be no disproof. "There is no other proof of a reading than the 
quality and endurance of its systematics."21 Interpretation is an answer, 
performance a question. The artist knows that questions are interesting and 
answers boring. Questions get us moving, but answers stop us in our tracks. 
Different words, different thing. 
—Herbert Blau22 
We were taught in school that a good poem cannot be paraphrased. Poetry 
is not in what you say but in how you say it, not in content but in reaction of 
content on form, not in the words but in the concrete collisions of the words. 
Every explication of the poem is therefore false to it as poetry, and true to it only 
insofar as it is reduced to something else. 
" T h e urge to explain the poem is an urge to degrade it. A true 
response to the poem does not reduce: it is a simulacrum, not an 
explanation. It demonstrates understanding not by saying what the 
poem says, but by doing what the poem does ." 
"But poetry is only a special case of literature, a privileged field for 
eccentricities that would not be tolerated in the sober light of prose. 
Poetry is language's Feast of Fools, proving the very norms it so 
flagrantly violates. Be sensible! Most language, and most literature for 
that matter, can be paraphrased. And when we do so, we are not 
degrading it. On the contrary, we favor it by displaying its meaning. 
Beware! o beware the lies of strolling players! They would have you 
believe that all literature is poetic!" 
" P O E T R Y IS N O DEVIANT! Poetry is the pure and original case of 
literature! And literature is precisely that use of language which 
escapes paraphrase." 
The performer now claims that his work is poetry, and insusceptible to 
paraphrase. If he is right, then like the poet he may claim to be his own law. 
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DOGS, CHILDREN, AND WORDS 
Through most of the theatre's history, performance has served as a ground 
for the figure of the agon. If the theatre is a mirror held up to nature, the 
holder has been hidden behind it, and we have seen what was written rather 
than the writing. Yet only in those moments when the glass became clear, and 
we saw the performer, did the stage come into focus. Only then did we see the 
actor in his pure function of disappointment. It is no wonder that we repress 
that primal scene; there are no words for it. 
" A m I accused of repression? Not content with the privilege of his 
idleness, with my license of his eccentric behavior, he would turn me 
out of the temple, would he? As if his rights were not founded by my 
speech! as if his sanctuary, his theatre, were not built on my command! 
Without my advocacy, he will wander outside the city gates!" 
" A n d precisely when, pray tell, does the actor appear on the stage of 
criticism? only when there's nothing else to write about. Only when the text 
is so debased, so antique, or so obscene, that a great actor carries it 
gasping and retching on his back. In the age of the actor-managers, or 
in the commedia, the circus, the music-hall, the vaudeville. Only then 
does the public fail to forget that it comes to the theatre to see acting. 
Beware, my fellows! o beware of words! for, like dogs and children, 
they steal the stage from you . " 
OPENING THE T E X T 
In a sense, no performance of a text can be as complete as my imagination 
of it, but that sense is mere tautology, for performance is what incompletes the 
text. Imagining the text, I confine its meaning, but performing the text, I 
open the cage again. The actor is a signifier who slips, sometimes on a banana 
peel, before the signified, interrupting the line of sight which, if completed, 
would terminate the text's activity.23 
A signifier is what best holds out against the immediate and conclusive 
establishment of a meaning: the texture of a voice, the resonance of 
music, the construction of a stage image. 
—Patrice Pavis24 
The thought of performance, when all is said and done, can survive only in a 
space opened up between the arousal and the completion of meaning, between 
that which means and that which is meant, between the arc of a finger and 
" C o m e he re . " Manipulating (perhaps eccentrically) Ferdinand de Saussure's 
articulation of the sign,25 the performance/theorist separates significance from 
meaning, maintaining that a thing can be a signifier even if we do not yet know 
what is signified by it. The quality of being a signifier, considered separately 
from what is signified, is called significance by Barthes26 and by Julia Kristeva.27 
The signifier opens the mystery with a question, while the signified closes a 
question with the answer. 
"Down in the sweatshops of the stage, the back face of the sign passes 
from hand to hand in its naked state. The lewd icon spreads its legs and 
Fall 1986 105 
invites your penetration, available to your unknown lust—and his— 
and hers—and theirs. You pay for your own meaning, planted in the 
actor's body, and when you have it you are sad again. You will return 
to re-enact the crisis of your truth, but it is you who are faithful—the 
actor is a whore. Marry him, and he must mock the vows or leave the 
stage, for though he represents desire, it is you who desire. Inspiring, 
he expresses nothing, but draws the breath with which you speak." 
" T h e sign is a unit! Inseparable! A signifier is such only if it signifies 
something. A signified is signified by something, which we call a signifier. 
You can no more have one without the other than I could drop this 
shoe without dropping . . . " 
"Observe his investment in the other shoe. Afloat in a sea of signification, 
he must beach himself on a signified island or drown. I, on the other 
hand, can tread water forever. I thrive on suspense. Do re mi fa so la 
ti. . . " 
Meaning, therefore, is in the spectator's, not the performer's mind. The 
actor, not yet wedded to a meaning, is like a screen on which many meanings 
might be projected, and he does not much care which. His signifiance is that 
quality by which he is able to signify, that attractive difference which draws the 
eye. 
When an arm is raised, there is raised in us a parallel dramatic state. 
—Jacques Lecoq28 
"Before you hear what I say, you must want to hear me. " 
" T h e 'performance/theorist' only confirms the ancient prejudice 
against actors: he says that an actor must be promiscuous, that his job is 
not to speak truth or to keep promises, but to seduce." 
"An actor refuses to be made honest. His training is a rigor of 
availability. Peeling the mind away from meaning as we would the soul 
from mammon, we scourge the flesh till it accepts its pleasure. We ring 
the body's changes, justified by grace rather than by t ru th . " 
"If you disavow truth, how can I defend you? I must speak your truth 
for you, whether you like it or no t . " 
If literature is the disappointment of language, then performance is the 
disappointment of literature. Performance refuses to complete itself; the 
performer inhabits a realm of the signifier, and performance/theory must 
penetrate that realm, taking great care not to commit the performer's 
"signifiant" differences to any fixed correspondence with particular sig-
nifieds. 
"Wha t is signified by F-sharp? Silly question. Yet if F-sharp were not 
signifiant, the instrument would not be built to play i t . " 
Before semiological vocabulary became current in the theatre, there were 
no intellectual tools for discussing the essential aspect of performance, for the 
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actor's work could not be discussed without interpretation, and therefore 
without reduction to discourse. Now that semiology has pried off the sign's 
lid, it may be possible to write performance/theory. 
T H E PRECISION OF DIFFERENCE 
These spiritual signs have a precise meaning which strikes us only 
intuitively but with enough violence to make useless any translation 
into logical discursive language. 
—Artaud29 
" I lift my arm to here rather than to here, and you pay attention." 
" I pay attention to your meaning, not to your gesture. Who cares 
about your a r m ? " 
Artaud pointed the way toward an idea of " meaning" that cannot be 
rendered in language. 
" N o w I've caught you at your own confusion. For it is, after all, a 
meaning that you claim. But how can there be a 'precise meaning' 
without a * language'? The answer is, there can't . 
"Ar taud, your patron saint, called for a 'language of signs'30—and 
gave the whole game away. Your revolt is shallower than you think. 
There is no attack here on language per se; you merely wish to 
substitute the limitations of a gestural language for those of learned 
discourse." 
" D o n ' t pay attention to Artaud on this matter. He was confused. No 
one taught him semiology. He knew not what he saw, because he had 
not split the s ign." 
"But he marvelled at the sense of meaning, the 'admirable intellec-
tuality', in the Balinese dance . " 
"Exactly! the 'sense of meaning, ' but not the meaning itself. As a 
Westerner confronted with this exotic object, he knew not the code by 
which these gestures could be resolved into meaning. And he saw that 
that resolution would be, on balance, a loss." 
Artaud's moment is the moment before meaning, when we attend to the 
acting rather than to what is acted, to the song rather than to what is sung. We 
pay the performer—when we pay him—to nurture that moment. But to the 
critical temper, an actor's skill must always seem a sin, venial perhaps, but 
nevertheless needy of forgiveness. 
Whenever it happens that I am more moved by the singing than by the 
thing that is sung, I admit that I have grievously sinned and then I 
wish rather not to have heard the singing. 
—St. Augustine31 
Yet the theoretician of performance must hear the singing. Missionary that he 
is, it is the singing he must save. He can only catch it in the throat of the 
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singer. He must enter the artist's body, going where that body goes and doing 
what it does. He must himself know what it is to scrawl graffiti over text. 
"Deprived of meaning, Artaud saw the fecundity of gesture, ready to 
burst with meaning that has not yet been born. It 's a matter of 
t iming." 
That moment at the top of the breath, when there is something to say 
though we know not yet what it is, belongs to the actor. When the thought is 
out, then we understand; but the actor is already gone, drawing the next 
breath. 
" N o language of gesture can speak for me. In performance, meaning 
is not a professional concern." 
The sign, as the performer speaks of it, is not a word in any language, for it 
lacks double articulation.32 Artistic signs are only singly articulated. Many 
sign-systems (like the musical scale) are articulated into atomic terms (twelve 
tones) which the linguist might call phonemes. But though these tones may be 
combined into phrases, sections, and movements, those second-order struc-
tures never attain a stable meaning: this particular chord cannot be counted on 
(outside of this work) to represent love, or Siegfried, or my cat. The musical 
syntax, in other words, never terminates in monemes (words). We never quite 
know what it means. So music never achieves a second articulation: it is not a 
language. Nor should we know what the actor's body means. The performer 
works beneath language, and somewhere between the two articulations, 
tending toward the second while never letting go of the first in order to attain 
it. The first articulation is the source of the second, a nutrient soup out of 
which it is formed, but which always threatens to dissolve and reform any 
particular language. Systems of gesture, insofar as they remain performance 
systems rather than languages, do not mean, but arouse meaning.3 3 
"You must learn to make fine distinctions: as fine as the difference 
between now—and now. And this distinction above all you must 
learn—between text that speaks and text that makes you speak for 
yourself. ' ' 
The actor is not so much a speaker as a guardian of the power of speech. 
He presents two faces to two different interests. To those invested in an 
established critical discourse, he presents a mask of destruction—the barbar-
ian against whom the gates are locked. To those who long for a language that 
asks new questions, he presents a mask of recreation—an Arthur returned 
from Avalon, legitimizing a new old order. It 's all in the timing. 
Performance/theory articulates the precision of things. On the stage, 
nothing doesn't matter.34 Language is swamped in signiflers that never knew 
themselves as such until they were—just this moment—tossed in from the 
wings. Things perform: the direction and tint of a light, the shape of a 
movement, the precise moment of an entrance, the texture of a sleeve, all sing 
louder than the words. A theatre that denies this desires its own death. 
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T H E INADVERTENT SELF 
One 's unsuccessful acts are the most successful . . . one's failure fulfills 
one's most secret wish. 
—Jacques Lacan35 
What we mean is what we cannot say. Our words are discreetly mocked by 
the behaviors on which they are broadcast. The content of our discourse is 
faulted by eruptions of form, which made and can remake on a whim the crust 
of language. Roland Barthes sang the accidental songs of things (clothes, food, 
cars, popular art) exposing the power of the sign to function through 
contradictory meanings. In winter, wine "is associated with all the myths of 
becoming warm, and at the height of summer, with all the images of shade, 
with all things cool and sparkling."3 6 Its "signifiance", shared in the eyes of 
citizens with the most diverse interests, binds a society together, transmuting 
extremities to moderation, "making a weak man strong or a silent, one 
talkative," giving the worker his "hear t for the work" and the intellectual his 
"viri l i ty" for the same.3 7 Acting as if wine possessed such., qualities, 
Frenchmen bind each other in the performance of its myth. 
Yet wine is only one of uncountable myths. Behind discourse, the carnival 
stripper throws her clothes in all directions, while the speaker thinks it is for 
him the crowd whistles. Never looking over his shoulder, a tool of mythology, 
he speaks in ignorance, though not in innocence. 
" M u s t I pursue you in the wrestling ring and the roller derby? the 
carnival and the street fair? the music hall? the burlesque house? the 
ball park? the sitcom? Shall I never find you on the Shakespearian 
stage?" 
" I f you want to speak in my name, you must follow me to places that 
will turn your nose. Performance is more honored in the stage's 
disgrace than in its triumph: when great words leave the stage in 
disgust, acting assumes its t i t le." 
The poem sounds sublime because we are holding the poet's underwear. 
T H E BRECHTIAN REVOLUTION 
For art to be "unpoli t ical" means only to ally itself with the " ru l ing" 
group. 
—Bertolt Brecht38 
Who has bought the amoral force of the signifier? It does not work for free. 
Forms are not neutral: they sold themselves in the streets before the play 
began, and the bidding was fierce. Political power is the power to decide how 
reality is signified, and the stage, an answerable form of the problem of 
knowledge, is a model of truth conditions. Its conventions determine the kinds 
of things that can be taken for true. Brecht's importance as a theoretician, 
therefore, lies not so much in his revolutionary politics as in his insight into 
the power of form for revolution or for reaction. The change that comes from 
devising new answers is superficial: to ask new questions, we must see by new 
rules, knowing that we make the rules up as we go along. 
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To transform himself from general passive acceptance to a correspond-
ing state of suspicious inquiry [man] would need to develop the 
detached eye with which the great Galileo observed a swinging 
chandelier. He was amazed by this pendulum motion, as if he had not 
expected it and could not understand its occurring, and this enabled 
him to come on the rules by which it was governed.39 
Barthes exposed the semiology in Brecht, who pulled the sign's lid off and 
released into our common air the strangeness which it had contained. 
Brecht divined the variety and relativity of semantic systems: the 
theatrical sign does not appear as a matter of course: what we call the 
naturalness of an actor or the truth of a performance is merely one 
language among others.40 
Strangeness explodes the obvious. Verfremdung exposes common sense cower-
ing in its polka-dot underwear; we are reminded that we have alternatives. 
Recovering the activity of sight, we can then participate again in the 
construction of signs and of language. It is most unfortunate, therefore, that 
Verfremdung is rendered in English as "al ienat ion," a word implying loss. 
"Alienation" may correctly render the sense of Marxian Entfremdung, that 
tragic loss by which " the object which labor produces—the product of labor— 
confronts it as an alien being, as a.power independent of the producer."4 1 But the 
tone and the direction of Verfremdung are opposed to that loss: Verfremdung is the 
moment in which the viewer reappropriates his previously alienated labor of 
meaning: not "Alas !" but " H a l t ! " , not a sigh but a rebel yell. The verfremdet 
reader, in Barthes's words, can "give nature a new apport ionment," and base 
this apportionment "not on 'natural ' laws but, quite the contrary, on man 's 
freedom to make things signify."42 Verfremdung is a festival for the repossession 
of mind. 
"Brecht 's moral role is to infiltrate a question into what seems self-
evident,"4 3 for clarity can enslave us. Brechtian perception is active, creating 
what it sees; a theatre of the scientific age must reward that activity. A 
Brechtian theatre must expose its own apparatus, reminding us that we 
ourselves make the leap from one half of the sign to the other, and that 
theatrical practice is always questionable. "There is no such thing as an 
'essence' of eternal a r t . " 4 4 The "falsely obvious" is only another ideology, 
serving someone's interest: " the foundation of the bourgeois statement of fact 
is common sense."4 5 " T h e evils men suffer are in their own hands . . . the 
world can be changed": by thought.46 But this can only happen if there is " a 
certain distance between signified and signifier: revolutionary art must admit 
a certain abitrary nature of signs."4 7 Otherwise, the artist only perpetuates an 
accepted code of " t r u t h , " of the " n a t u r e " of life or of the human being. The 
artist therefore must think politically, for if he does not know whom he serves, 
he will serve the worst. "Wha t is involved here is essentially a morality of 
invention."4 8 Who knows the nature of human life? Who has the right to 
claim to know? Any revolutionary faith must believe in transformation, the 
reshuffling of signs. 
The continuity of the ego is myth. A man is an atom that perpetually 
breaks up and forms anew. 
—Brecht49 
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T H E DEATH OF THE AUTHOR 
A text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. 
—Barthes50 
Why do you buy tickets? What do you expect? There is a joke about the 
actor who "played Hamle t " (and lost). Does the joke mean that he "got it 
wrong"? I think not—did you know " the answer"? If you knew the answer 
already, why did you go to the theatre? To demonstrate your superiority? 
" I f you really believe you are better off in the theatre of your mind, by 
all means stay there. But tonight you bought a ticket. I don't think you 
came here to give an examination. You came here hoping against hope 
that you would be surprised. You may not know this, of course. If I 
surprise you, you may be offended. Yet you came here because truth no 
longer pleases you, and you want something more. You can't stay 
away, can you?" 
The actor who played Hamlet and lost is an actor who failed to exceed his 
text. Correct but boring. There is, of course, such a thing as simple 
incompetence, but it is easy to spot, and does not sour the stomach like 
mediocrity. What we ask of the actor is not that he hold the text in place (the 
printed page does that very nicely, thank you) but that he keep it moving 
toward us, for he serves the text's destination, not its origin. So he must view 
the author 's critical assassination with interest. He cannot pretend neutrality. 
His public, no matter what it thinks it wants, has never excused any neglect of 
itself. And hard pressed as he is to keep the stage alive, an actor has only the 
text (not its author's intention) to help him. No matter how hard he stares at 
the page, he sees only the words. But staring long enough, he begins to see 
how the words want to move under his eyes, and that movement is his scenario. 
What does Barthes have in mind as he longs for " the death of the 
author"? 5 1 a political change, a delivery of power from a certain kind of 
"cr i t ic" into the hands of a certain kind of " reader . " In fighting for the right 
of fresh reading, Barthes has become the legitimate revolutionary chief of 
actors, who belong to the ancient profession of fresh reading. The actor opens 
up his text, and passes it to us before it closes again. He practices the widest 
possible aperture of the sign, while the author's " intent ion" (or the director's 
"concept") functions chiefly as a sphincter. The author whom Barthes wants 
to kill is the author who (I assure you) turns over in his grave •when you speak 
in a way that / don' t like. The appeal to the author was always already false, 
even on the drama's first day, for when vegetables begin to fly, it is not the 
author who receives them in the face. The only authors who ever ruled the 
stage were also actors. 
. . . the language lined with flesh, a text where we can hear the grain of 
the throat, the patina of consonants, the voluptuousness of vowels, a 
whole carnal stereophany . . ,52 
The academy makes for itself the scarecrow of an author, to protect its 
garden of text; the clerics flap its arms to scare away the vagrant birds who 
would read the text directly. But the actor has always read scripture in the 
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vernacular. He has direct access to the Word. When the dummy is buried, the 
text will breathe freely again. Then we will unfasten its corset, the law will 
relax, and " the anonymous body of the actor" will reign supreme: his flesh 
"granulates, it crackles, it grates, it cuts, it comes: that is bl iss ."5 3 Make no 
mistake about it: in liberating the actor from the author 's false authority (and 
from the falser authority of the director, his lieutenant),54 we liberate the text 
itself, which never wants to stop speaking, even to the person who penned it. 
" M y own words," wrote Maurice Merleau-Ponty, " take me by surprise and 
teach me what I th ink." 5 5 The historical author dies to his text in writing it, 
each word pushed onto the page like the bottled message pushed out to sea. 
The words still his are the words not written yet. 
W I L D MAGIC 
Everyone then his own magician, and no man a magician alone. 
—Ihab Hassan5 6 
Socrates taught us to draw divisions, and to expel the poets from the 
republic of discourse; but performance/theory seeks to recover a mode of 
thought older than Socrates, in which assertion and imagination have not yet 
been split apart. We aspire to a discourse that will bridge poetry and 
philosophy, performance and thought. The actor informs us that we must let 
words run naked again, splitting the sign, dismantling the double articulation 
of language to reveal the shifting signifiers beneath, precise differences 
marked by that power which they never quite spend. With an authoritative 
gesture, I hold these available icons open for penetration. 
Words should hang like lovely fruits on the indifferent tree of 
narrative.57 
The thought of Roland Barthes performs, and his criticism sings with the 
Syren grain of the voice: an imminent criticism, it hopes to reflect for a 
moment the movements of that flesh which it inhabits. 
Literary language . . . hereby appears as an enormous and sumptuous 
debris, the fragmentary residue of an Atlantis where the words, 
overfed on color, on shape, in short on qualities and not on ideas, shine 
like the splinters of a direct, unthought world which no logic can 
< manage to dim.5 8 
EPILOGUE: T H E CRITIC 'S LAMENT 
" I t would be easy for the critic to let himself be seduced, not only 
because the theory that Barthes inspires aims at a theatrical and 
therefore seductive effect, but also because Barthes put his finger on the 
critic's weak spot. In our envious secret fantasies of power, we 
penetrate so deeply into the poem that we become the poet: the critical 
work is a vicarious satisfaction of the urge for a forbidden pleasure. 
Now they tell us that the proscription is repealed. We can safely come 
out of the closet with the poet's clothes on. 
" A n attractive prospect. But in considering it, the critic is deciding 
whether to remain a critic. Knowledge by impersonation is a knowl-
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edge that cannot be spoken—and what sort of a critic would it be who 
could not speak? 
"You don' t suppose, do you, that we enjoy this? The work of 
criticism is no picnic, though it is carried on in the proximity of a 
festival. It is the critic who works through your holidays, keeping open 
the office which others have forsaken. As long as he wishes to keep his 
position, he may not go out the door, though he may observe the 
carnival through the curtains of an office window." 
To write about performance is no easy thing, yet it must be done; and if it 
is not done well, it is not done at all. One must turn discourse against itself. 
One must allude to thought that escapes language. One must pay homage to 
exactly meaningless differences. Can you tell, at any given moment, which of 
my contestant voices is speaking this essay's end? 
" T h e price of explanation is to lose the thing explained: the promised land 
is always over the horizon. To live in the work's presence, a power of 
astonishment is required, astonishment that flickers with weakness of the 
flesh, yet allows that critical glimpse of the promise, while the mist lifts for a 
moment in the afternoon." 
Washington University 
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